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PRIVATE PARTY PROTECTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL
RADIATION POLLUTION THROUGH COMPULSORY ARBITRATION:
A PROPOSAL
by Ann Voorhees Billingsley*
The peaceful use of nuclear energy has produced dangers of a new
and special kind. The risks which the use of nuclear energy involves can
only be controlled by the use of complicated technical equipment and
installations .... In addition, in the event of radiation accidents lead-
ing to radioactive pollution of the air and waters, damage affecting sev-
eral countries may in many cases have to be reckoned with .... The
peculiarities of radioactivity and its great potential danger seem to stress
the importance of ... taking international measures against radiation
accidents."
I. INTRODUCTION
T he worldwide nuclear industry has grown tremendously over the
past two decades and is expected to continue growing.' This growth
* Practicing with the United States Environmental Protection Agency, Enforcement
Division, Region H. B.S., University of California at Los Angeles (1976), J.D., Case Western
Reserve University School of Law (1979). Admitted to practice before the Bar of the State
of New York and the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts
of New York. Member of the American Bar Association. The author would like to thank
Messrs. Henry T. King, Jr., Chief Corporate International Counsel for TRW, Inc., and Ed-
win R. Teple, attorney and labor arbitrator, for their guidance in preparing this article. The
views expressed herein are those of the author only and do not necessarily represent the
views of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.
I Pelzer, Legal Problems of International Danger Protection and of International
Emergency Assistance in the Event of Radiation Accidents, in 3 PEAcEFUL USES OF AToMIc
ENERGY 451, 453 (1972).
2 Bauser, United States Nuclear Export Policy: Developing the Peaceful Atom as a
Commodity in International Trade, 18 HARv. INT'L L.J. 227, 229 (1977). At the May 1977
London Summit, a conference held by the leaders of seven industrial countries, participants
agreed that nuclear energy use should be increased. "We agree on the need to increase nu-
clear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements." Summit Communiqug Stresses
Agreement on Economic Cooperation, Expanded Trade, 16 INT'L LEGAL MATERiALS 724,724
(1977). "Our objective is to meet the world's energy needs and to make peaceful use of
nuclear energy widely available. . . . "Id. at 727. Although in recent years nuclear industry
growth has slowed dramatically in the United States, it has continued to develop rapidly in
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means that more nuclear power plants are operating around the globe,
more spent nuclear fuels is being transported and reprocessed, more nu-
clear-powered ships are plying the oceans, and more nuclear wastes are
being transported, stored, and disposed.
All of these activities result in the delivery of energy to millions of
people. Unfortunately, all of these activities also carry enormous risks of
radioactive pollution with resultant harm to persons and property. An ac-
cident at a nuclear power plant or at a reprocessing facility, such as a fire,
an earthquake, or a cooling system failure, could release highly radioac-
tive materials into the environment.4 A transportation accident, such as a
truck crash, a train wreck, or a ship collision, could break open containers
of highly radioactive spent fuel or radioactive waste, releasing those
materials into the environment. A collision involving a nuclear-powered
ship could break open the nuclear reactor on board, releasing its radioac-
tive contents into the air and sea.5 A poorly planned or poorly supervised
nuclear energy program could result in intentional releases of radioactiv-
ity from nuclear power plants' and intentional dumping of inadequately
contained or even uncontained nuclear wastes into the sea.7
several other countries, notably France, West Germany, Sweden, Japan, and the Soviet
Union. See The New York Times, April 11, 1982, at E5, col. 2.
3 "Spent fuel" is nuclear fuel which has been used over a period of months in a nuclear
reactor to produce energy and is no longer useful for producing energy.
' After several months of operation, a typical, large nuclear power plant may contain
about one-third of a ton of gaseous or volatile, highly radioactive materials. UNION OF CON-
CERNED SCIENTISTS, THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR POWER REACTORS 1 (R. Hubbard & G. Minor
eds. 1977). At reprocessing plants highly radioactive spent fuel is removed from its protec-
tive containers and passed through several operations to separate wastes from usable fuel
materials. See generally id. for a thorough treatment of the probabilities of accidents occur-
ring at these facilities.
I "The possible damages which might result from accidents involving vessels propelled
by nuclear reactors stagger the imagination .... The risks, even in proportion to the sig-
nificant gains from nuclear ships, are well beyond the limits acceptable to the private sec-
tor." A. FRYE, THE HAZARDS OF ATOMIc WASTES-PERSPECTIVES AND PROPOSALS ON OCEANIC
DISPOSAL 29 (1962).
' "Most [nuclear power plant] reactors routinely release effluents containing small
quantities of radioactivity into the aquatic environment, and there have been incidents of
accidental uncontrolled releases." R. SHINN, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF MARINE POLLU-
TION CONTROL 18 (1974). "The United Kingdom has continued to release liquid wastes [from
its nuclear power plants], despite the possible danger of accidental discharges, from its
thee-mile-long pipeline at Windscale, Calder, into the Irish Sea, basing release limits on the
average consumption of Welsh laver bread made of contaminated seaweed." Id. at 30.
1 From 1946 to 1971, the United States allowed low level radioactive wastes to be
dumped at sea with little administrative or technical control. Most of the waste was con-
tained in 55-gallon drums, many without tops, which were weighted with concrete and sunk.
Id. at 21-22. No one is sure that the drums have not burst from the intense pressures ex-
isting at the lower levels of the ocean or from striking the ocean floor. A. FRYE, supra note 5,
at 34. Nuclear-powered ships are still allowed to inject uncontained low level wastes into the
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Since radioactive pollution can travel through the air, infiltrate wa-
terways, or disperse in the sea, opportunities abound for persons of one
State to suffer radiation damage caused by the activities of persons of
another State (transnational radiation damage). For example, a power
plant accident in one State might release highly radioactive gases into the
air which could travel over the State's border, injuring persons in an ad-
joining country. Operators of a power plant might intentionally release
low-level wastes into the nearby sea (such as is done by power plant oper-
ators in the United Kingdom) and injure persons of another nationality
who consume plant life harvested from the area.8 If consumers subse-
quently refuse to use that plant life, harvesters and food manufacturers
from several countries may suffer business losses. If a nuclear power com-
pany or disposal operation carelessly dumps nuclear wastes at sea, several
marine organisms might become contaminated. This could result in radio-
actively contaminated fish, which could injure consumers of several na-
tions and in turn could hurt the fishing industries in many nations.9 The
radioactivity could also damage organisms which occupy a low position in
the marine food chain, reducing the number of higher ocean organisms,
namely fish, and subsequently damaging the fishing industries. An acci-
dental release of radioactive material on the high seas could prevent the
passage of ships from all nations through the area, and could interfere
with the laying and repair of submarine cables and with mining or drill-
upper layer of the ocean. Id. at 19-20; R. SHINN, supra note 6, at 30.
' The English base the allowable limit of nuclear waste disposal in the Irish Sea upon
an estimate of the average consumption of the locally harvested seaweed, R. SHINN, supra
note 6, at 30, and also, of course, upon an estimate of the amount of radioactivity to which a
human can safely be exposed. But periodically, experts in nuclear science have revised the
recommended permissible levels of human exposure to radiation. These levels "have dis-
played a consistent downward trend. As knowledge has advanced, there has grown the con-
viction that the human organism can tolerate less radiation than had originally been
thought." A. FRYE, supra note 5, at 5. "There is increasing evidence, not yet wholly con-
firmed, that low levels of radiation may induce cancer more readily than is now believed."
Letter from the Union of Concerned Scientists to sponsors (Feb. 1978)(Cambridge, Massa-
chusetts). Thus, the English practice, although presently believed to be safe, may eventually
be shown to have harmed consumers of the seaweed.
9 Each year there is a greater dependence upon the sea as a source of food. L. HYDEMAN
& W. BERMAN, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF NucLEAR MAnrIIME AcTrvrrms 207 (1960); S.
PIKE & A. SPILHAUS, MARINE RESOURCES 2, 3 (1962). Tests have revealed that many sea
creatures concentrate radioactive elements in their bodies by factors of up to 100,000 times
the amounts of the radioactive elements in the waters around them. A. FRYE, supra note 5,
at 13. The danger to consumers of contaminated fish is aggravated by the fact that very
small amounts of radioactivity, which would be harmless if exposed to the body externally,
may do severe damage if taken into the body. Id. For a discussion of the different types of
radioactive products associated with nuclear energy and their relative dangers, see Note, A
Survey of the United States Treaties and Agreements Involving the Peaceful Uses of Nu-
clear Energy, 10 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 671, 678-81, 702 (1978).
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ing operations. 10 Such obvious dangers of nuclear pollution are com-
pounded by the fact that nuclear wastes remain radioactive for 600 to
250,000 years. 1
What can citizens of one State do to protect themselves against radi-
ation damage caused by activities in another State? What legal mecha-
nisms exist for recovering monetary compensation for harm suffered?
More important, what mechanisms exist for preventing the harm which
threatens to result from the activities of members of another State? The
law of neighborly relations, an internationally accepted principle, dictates
that a person may not use his property so as to injure his neighbor's. 12
Furthermore, several international agreements and conventions are pres-
ently in effect which give substance to this rule in the form of anti-pollu-
tion agreements and liability agreements. But it is evident that this gen-
eral rule of international law and the international agreements
promulgated thereunder do not provide private parties with an effective
means of protecting themselves against transnational radiation pollution.
Relief under general international law and under these agreements, if at
all available to a private party, usually must be pursued through ineffi-
10 As time goes on, it appears that more nuclear wastes will be dumped at sea. Many
European countries have little or no land disposal sites and have turned to ocean disposal as
the solution to their nuclear waste problems. R. SHINN, supra note 6, at 21.
11 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES - NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, REPORT ON DisPo-
SAL OF RADIOACTIVE WASTE ON LAND 3 (1957); Note, The National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969 and Nuclear Power Plant Licensing: Judicial Modification of Agency Rulemak-
ing; Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 26
DEPAUL L. REv. 666, 668 n.8 (1977).
12 This principle also prohibits the pollution of international waters when it might have
harmful effects in the territory of another State. Bramsen, Transnational Pollution and
International Law, in PROBLEMS IN TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 257, 261 (1974). The law of
neighborly relations was invoked in the famous Trail Smelter Case (United States v. Ca-
nada), 3 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1905 (1941) reprinted in 35 AM. J. INT'L L. 684 (1941), and in
the Corfu Channel Case, [1949] I.C.J. 22. It is recognized by many international jurists and
legal scholars as a general principle of international law. Bramsen, supra, at 260. The most
notable proof that the law of neighborly relations is accepted in the international sphere is
the Declaration on the Human Environment, made by the United Nations Conference held
in Stockholm in June, 1972. Principle 21 of the Declaration states:
21. States [have], in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and
the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own re-
sources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility to
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control [do] not cause damage to
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.
[19721 U.N.Y.B. 317, 320-21. This principle was endorsed by the United Nations General
Assembly in Assembly Resolution 2995, 27 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 30) 42, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1973). Although the Stockholm Declaration is not binding upon States, it was gen-
erally the view of the states at the Conference that Principle 21 was an affirmation of ex-
isting responsibility under international law. Bramsen, supra at 278 n.20.
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cient diplomatic channels or expensive judicial proceedings in a foreign
State. A better means of private party protection would be the use of
arbitration, supervised by an international body staffed by experts in the
field of transnational radiation pollution.
This article will examine the effects of the law of neighborly relations
and the protections afforded private parties under the above-mentioned
conventions and agreements. A proposal will then be set forth for the use
of arbitration as a means of private party protection against transnational
radiation pollution.
11. THE LAW OF NEIGHBORLY RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS PROMULGATED UNDER THE LAW
A. The Law'of Neighborly Relations
The law of neighborly relations is embodied in the maxim: sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas. (Use your own property so as not to injure
your neighbor's.) This is a well-accepted principle of international law.13
But standing alone, the maxim affords little practical protection to pri-
vate citizens who seek to prevent or to obtain reparation for transnational
radiation pollution. Following are discussions of the various means with
which a person might seek to protect himself under the general interna-
tional principle of neighborly relations.
1. Suits brought in one country against foreign states or foreign
citizens
A person may bring a suit in his own country against a foreign State
or a foreign citizen, but he has no guarantee that a resultant judgment
will be enforced in the other country. A State which has lost a suit or
defaulted might very well claim sovereign immunity and refuse to satisfy
the judgment rendered against it.14 A foreign citizen who has lost a suit
"1 See 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 346 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955); and
see supra note 12.
14 Suits brought in the United States against foreign countries are automatically backed
by United States foreign policy, codified in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976,
28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391, 1441, 1446, 1602 - 1611 (1976). Section 1602 of that Act states
that "[u]nder international law, states are not immune from the jurisdiction of foreign
courts insofar as their commercial activities are concerned .... " In the section 1603(d)
definition of a commercial activity, the Act states: "The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course or conduct or particular trans-
action or act, rather than by reference to its purpose." This description presumably covers
the activities related to nuclear power plants operated by foreign States, and also would
include the operation of State-owned nuclear powered vessels being used for commercial
purposes. Under section 1605(a)(2), a foreign State shall not be immune from the jurisdic-
tion of Federal or State courts in the United States in any case "in which the action is based
1982
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might be able to avoid satisfying the resultant judgment by taking advan-
tage of differences between the laws of the two countries involved. En-
forcement of such suits must, as a practical matter, be left primarily to
authorities in the offender's country.15 The authorities in most civil and
common law countries will not enforce foreign court judgments against
their citizens unless the judgments have a basis in the laws of the State in
which they are to be enforced.16 Such laws may not exist. Moreover, al-
though the authorities of many countries accept the validity of monetary
judgments awarded against their citizens in a foreign court of law, many
feel that injunctions issued by foreign courts constitute interference with
the sovereignty of the State.17 Even if all of the aforementioned obstacles
can be overcome, a civil trial will almost inevitably be expensive" and
time consuming for the plaintiff.
2. Participation in administrative proceedings or litigation in a for-
eign country
Some of the problems of domestic court litigation against foreign
parties could be circumvented by bringing suit against a polluter in the
polluter's own country. Even better, from the plaintiff's standpoint,
would be participation in the foreign State's administrative proceedings
which are held prior to licensing a nuclear power plant or other poten-
... upon an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States
.... "Even if the operation of nuclear power plants and nuclear-powered vessels do not
qualify as commercial activities, section 1605(a)(5) of the Act further disallows the defense
of sovereign immunity in cases of the type contemplated in this discussion, on wider
grounds. That subsection states that a foreign State shall not be immune in cases not other-
wise encompassed in section 1605(a)(2):
in which money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or
death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and caused
by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or employee
of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment.
Thus a United States citizen, bolstered by whatever effect the Foreign Sovereign Immu-
nities Act may have in another country, might meet with reasonable success in obtaining
satisfaction of a judgment rendered in a United States court against a foreign State. Of
course, one of the main purposes of this Act is to allow United States courts to seize foreign-
owned property within the United States to satisfy such judgments. Most transnational ra-
diation damage cases will not, however, involve situations in which the offender has prop-
erty in the United States. Citizens in similar circumstances in other countries lacking the
underlying force of such an act would probably experience far less success.
15 L. HYDEMAN & W. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 335.
16 McCaffrey, Private Remedies for Transfrontier Pollution Injuries, in ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW - INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE ASPECTS 12, 20 (J. Nowak ed. 1976).
11 Id. at 19-20.
's Normally, suits are fairly expensive undertakings, and costs become even greater
when process must be served and discovery undertaken in a foreign country.
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tially polluting activity (and, of course, before radiation pollution occurs).
Unfortunately, many States will not permit foreigners access to the
States' administrative and judicial proceedings. 19
Several international bodies, such as the Council of Europe and the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD), have
recommended that such access be granted to foreign parties who have
been or may be injured by transfrontier pollution.20 The OECD specifi-
cally recommends21 that countries of origin22 ensure that any person who
is threatened with or has suffered transfrontier pollution damage receives
equivalent treatment to that afforded a complainant in a case of domestic
pollution.2" Equivalent treatment, according to the OECD, includes the
right to participate in administrative and judicial proceedings in order to
obtain injunctive or monetary relief.24 If the domestic law of a country
permits non profit groups, such as environmental defense organizations,
to commence proceedings to safeguard environmental interests, the
OECD recommends that similar foreign groups should be allowed the
same right.25 Similarly, the OECD recommends, equivalent rights should
be given to public authorities in foreign countries.2"
Such a regime of equal access and nondiscrimination has been insti-
tuted to some extent in parts of Europe and in North America.27 But
worldwide, this method of transfrontier radiation pollution protection
lacks the consistency and predictability necessary to ensure private party
redress. 2
s
It is important to note that a suit brought in a foreign State would
almost inevitably be more expensive and more time consuming than a
suit instituted domestically. Domestic lawyers would probably have to
spend more time than usual researching the relevant foreign law. Domes-
tic lawyers might also be likely to execute the formal steps required in the
foreign suit slowly and inefficiently because of an unfamiliarity with the
foreign system. Foreign lawyers may need to be hired to represent the
plaintiff in the actual proceedings, along with interpreters and transla-
29 McCaffrey, supra note 16, at 21.
20 Id. at 12.
21 OECD Recommendation of the Council for the Implementation of a Regime of Equal
Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution,
C(77)28(Final) (Paris, May 23, 1977), reprinted in OECD, LEGAL ASPECTS OF TRANS-
FRONTIER POLLUTION 29 (1977).
22 "Country of origin" is defined as any country within which transfrontier pollution
originates or could originate. Id. at Introduction (e), 30.
23 Id. Title B (Legal Protection of Persons) § 4(a), at 32.
24 Id. § 4(b), at 32.
25 Id. § 6(a), at 32.
28 Id. § 7, at 33.
2'7 McCaffrey, supra note 16, at 21.
28 Id. at 22.
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tors. Finally, despite the Council of Europe and OECD recommenda-
tions, a foreign court is likely to be biased in favor of the local parties and
interests involved in the suit. 9
3. Suits brought by a government before the international court of
justice
A person might succeed in convincing his government to bring an
action before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against another
government which is causing transnational pollution, or whose citizens
are doing so. 30 But the difficulties of convincing one's national govern-
ment to bring such a suit would bar any but the most extreme cases from
obtaining government representation.3 1
Even if a national government were to pursue a transnational pollu-
tion case on behalf of one of its citizens, the case would likely fail. Al-
though the ICJ has recognized the validity of the principle of neighborly
relations in international law,32 cases brought before the Court solely
upon the basis of this general principle usually do not meet with success.
The ICJ seems to require that a State have a "direct interest" in the
outcome of the case before the State may institute proceedings.33 For
example, Australia and New Zealand attempted to bring a suit against
France in 1973, to stop France from conducting atmospheric nuclear tests
in the South Pacific. The Court avoided deciding the issue in the case by
stating that since France had publicly announced that it would cease fur-
ther atmospheric tests, no decision was required. The dissenting opinion
of Judge de Castro bodes ill for similar cases in the future. The Judge
stated: "The Applicant has no legal title authorizing it to act as a spokes-
man for the international community and ask the Court to condemn
France's conduct. 34 Bo Johnson, then Associate Professor of Interna-
29 In a number of countries, courts are not very independent of their governments or
they display judicial prejudices in favor of their governments. Lecture by Henry T. King, Jr.
& Edwin R. Teple, Case Western Reserve University School of Law, (Jan. 30, 1978).
10 A private person may not be a party to a suit before the ICJ. See the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 34, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 993, which
states, "1. Only states may be parties in cases before the Court."
31 There would almost certainly be practical and procedural difficulties involved in
meeting with high government officials and instigating a government suit before the ICJ.
Moreover, a government might refuse to pursue some meritorious suits because of diplo-
matic considerations.
32 B. JOHNSON, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 16 (1976).
33 Id. at 17.
31 Id. at 18. In other words, if Judge de Castro's view prevails in the future, the ICJ will
not hear those suits involving potential transnational pollution which are brought on the
basis that the pollution violates the law of neighborly relations, and the complainant is
within the area of the pollution.
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tional Law at the University of Stockholm, commented that "[t]his obvi-
ous denial of actio popularis in the environmental field will make it ex-
tremely difficult for states to go before the Court with disputes of this
nature unless the interpretation of specific treaties is involved. At this
stage general international law does not afford nature much protection."35
It would, therefore, be almost impossible for a private party to pro-
tect itself against transnational radiation pollution through a govern-
ment-level suit before the ICJ. Even if such a suit were to proceed suc-
cessfully, the process would likely take several years to complete.36
Furthermore, such a suit would necessarily be removed from the control
of the complaining party.37
4. Arbitration by governments or governmental bodies
A person suffering from or fearing radiation damage might utilize the
same domestic channels which would be followed when urging his govern-
ment to initiate a suit before the ICJ, but with the intent of instituting
arbitration proceedings. The previously discussed difficulties of inducing
government officials to pursue a complaint against another country
would, of course, be encountered.38 Furthermore, it appears that a coun-
try does not have the power to compel another country to arbitrate a
dispute unless a treaty or agreement concerning the matter in question
has previously been concluded between the countries. For example, the
Trail Smelter Arbitration s between the State of Washington, in the
United States, and the Province of British Columbia, in Canada, appar-
ently was possible only because an earlier boundary pact between the
United States and Canada contained provisions dealing with the subject
matter of the dispute.40
Government-initiated arbitration would be less time consuming than
would pursuit of a case before the ICJ.41 However, the arbitration process
35 Id.
'0 For example, Ethiopa and Liberia brought suit, in 1960, against South Africa alleging
that South Africa's policy of apartheid violated the United Nations Mandate. South West
Africa Cases, I.C.J. Pleadings (1966). The South West Africa Cases were before the ICJ for
six years before a decision was rendered. It is interesting to note that the cases were dis-
missed on the ground that the claimants had not established a sufficient legal right or inter-
est in the subject matter of their claims to bring the suit. See Eubanks, International Arbi-
tration in the Political Sphere, 26 ARn. J. 129, 139, 139 n.13 (1971).
'7 Since only States may be parties in proceedings before the ICJ (see Statute of ICJ,
supra note 30), the private party who initiated the process leading to the suit would not be
represented as an individual before the Court.
" See supra note 31.
"Trail Smelter Case, supra note 12.
,o A. FRYE, supra note 5, at 23.
41 The Ram of Kutch dispute between India and Pakistan, for example, was decided by
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would still entail the above-mentioned drawbacks: the difficulty of initiat-
ing the proceedings, and the ultimate removal of the case from the indi-
vidual complainant's control.
5. Diplomatic negotiations
If a person is injured, particularly if he is one of several citizens simi-
larly affected, he might be able to convince his government to pursue dip-
lomatic channels and negotiate a monetary settlement with the polluting
country. Initial difficulties at the domestic level, such as reaching high-
level officials and convincing them that the complaint is meritorious,
would have to be surmounted.4 Additionally, damage claims which are to
be pursued through diplomatic channels are usually reduced to one lump
sum by the complainants' government (presettlement) before the govern-
ment will press a claim against the other country.4" This will almost inev-
itably involve a compromise to determine the amount due the complain-
ant, prior to beginning the diplomatic negotiations. Furthermore, once
the complainant has presettled with his government, the matter will then
be removed from the citizen's direct control.
An example of such a diplomatic settlement is the award made by
the United States to the Government of Japan in compensation for inju-
ries suffered by Japanese fishermen from nuclear tests conducted by the
United States in the Marshall Islands.4 4 Diplomatic negotiations between
the two Governments culminated in an exchange of notes in which the
United States agreed to pay Japan the lump sum of two million dollars,
to be distributed according to the Japanese Government's discretion. No
mention was made in the notes about future precautions to be observed
by the United States with regard to nuclear tests. The notes did specifi-
cally state that "legal liability" was not addressed in the negotiations, and
therefore was not to be inferred from the monetary payment. Thus, the
diplomatic settlement compensated the fishermen for their radiation pol-
lution injuries, 45 but created neither legal precedent nor obligations with
regard to the safety of future actions by the United States. This example
international arbitration in 18 months. Eubanks, supra note 36, at 139. By contrast, the
South West Africa Cases, supra note 36, spent six years before the ICJ.
41 See supra note 31.
"s Reisman, The Multifaceted Phenomenon of International Arbitration, 24 ARB. J. 68,
83 (1969).
4 Japan - Personal and Property Damage Claims, Jan. 4, 1955, United States-Japan,
6 U.S.T. 1, T.1.A.S. No. 3160.
4 Two million dollars seems to be quite low compensation, even in 1955, for radiation
injuries suffered by a group of persons. The lump sum award probably resulted in smaller
individual payments to the fishermen than could have been obtained, for example, by U.S.
citizens bringing domestic tort actions for the same injuries.
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demonstrates that even if diplomatic negotiations are completed, full pro-
tection for a citizen against transnational radiation pollution may not be
provided.
6. Summary
The law of neighborly relations is considered a valid principle in in-
ternational law, yet, as a practical matter, in most situations this law
merely creates a right without a remedy. Decisions rendered on the basis
of the law in domestically adjudicated suits against foreign citizens or
States might not be enforced, and litigation or participation in adminis-
trative proceedings in the polluting country under the auspices of the
principle may not be allowed. If allowed, such proceedings would proba-
bly entail many expenses and difficulties caused by unfamiliarity with the
foreign system. Government suits brought before the ICJ on the basis of
the law of neighborly relations have failed in the past. Government-initi-
ated arbitration seems possible only when an already extant treaty be-
tween the nations involved covers the matter in dispute. Diplomatic nego-
tiations fail to set precedents or articulate obligations for the future, and
may result in inadequate compensation for the injured parties. In addi-
tion, government-level actions (suits before the ICJ, arbitration, and dip-
lomatic negotiations) necessarily involve a loss of direct control over the
case by the individual complainant. Furthermore, a government will pur-
sue such actions only in a very small minority of severe cases of transna-
tional radiation pollution.
It is clear that, as a practical matter, in order to create a remedy for
violation of the right, an international agreement embodying the law of
neighborly relations presently is required. Two authors have commented
on this fact: "while an understanding of the rights of States is important,
the existence of a legal right in a State to protect its interests may not
obviate the need for international agreements." 46
B. International Agreements Promulgated Under the Law of Neigh-
borly Relations
Two kinds of international agreements deal with the problems of
transnational radiation pollution: anti-pollution conventions and liability
agreements. These will be examined to determine what legal duties they
create, and whether they provide useful means with which the private
citizen may protect himself against transnational radiation pollution.
46 L. Hv EmAN & W. B .mAN, supra note 9, at 11.
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1. Anti-pollution conventions
Article 25 of the Convention on the High Seas, done in 1958,'" states
that every State shall take measures to prevent pollution of the seas from
the dumping of radioactive waste. This provision creates a duty on the
part of signatory States to try to prevent radioactive pollution of the seas,
and thus constitutes more a statement of intent than an explicit duty.
The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water 48 (Nuclear Test Ban Treaty) contains
more definite duties than does the Convention on the High Seas. One of
the purposes of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is to put an end to the
contamination of the environment by radioactive substances released in
nuclear weapon tests.49 In Article I, paragraph 1 of the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty, the parties agree:
to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test ex-
plosion, or any other nuclear explosion . . . (a) in the atmosphere; be-
yond its limits, including outer space; or underwater, including territorial
waters or high seas; or (b) in any other environment if such explosion
causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of
the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is
conducted.50
Two anti-dumping conventions deal with the intentional disposal of
radioactive wastes in the sea. The Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft51 states, in Article
14, that the contracting parties (signatory States) pledge to promote mea-
sures concerning the protection of the marine environment against pollu-
tion caused by radioactive materials. This provision, like the statement
in Article 25 of the Convention on the High Seas, is more a statement of
intent than an agreement to assume a legal duty. The Convention on the
Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Mat-
"' Law of the Sea: Convention on the High Seas, done Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 11.
" Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, done Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
41 Id. Preamble.
"0 It should be noted that nuclear weapons testing continues to contribute to radioac-
tive pollution of the ocean despite the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. France and the People's
Republic of China lave not signed the Treaty and continue to conduct atmospheric testing
over the oceans. They defend this testing on the grounds that such testing is reasonable
given a State's need to protect its own security by developing weapons. R. SHINN, supra note
6, at 69.
51 Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping From Ships and
Aircraft, done Feb. 15, 1972, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND
TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF THE SEA 457, (U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/16 (1974).
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ter 52 sets forth three classes of materials which the signatory States agree
to treat in specified ways. The first class of materials (the "blacklist")
includes high level radioactive waste which may not be dumped at all.
The other two classes include low level radioactive waste which may be
dumped under special or general permits issued by the national authori-
ties having jurisdiction over the vessels performing the dumping
operations.5
Neither the Convention on the High Seas nor the Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty create rights of action for private parties. They are subject only to
the usual methods of treaty enforcement between States: diplomatic ne-
gotiations, suits before the ICJ, government-level arbitration, and sanc-
tions by international bodies, such as expulsion from the United Nations.
Private parties, therefore, do not have any individually enforceable rights
under these treaties. Similarly, the anti-dumping conventions require that
violations of the conventions shall be reported to governmental authori-
ties and dealt with by them. Thus, although these anti-pollution conven-
tions create a few specific duties concerning radiation pollution preven-
tion, they do not provide any means for private party enforcement of
these duties.
2. Liability agreements
The Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships" es-
tablishes that nuclear ship operators shall be absolutely liable for any nu-
clear damage caused by a nuclear incident involving the nuclear fuel of,
or radioactive products or waste produced in their ships.5 This liability is
limited to 1500 million francs per incident exclusive of interest and costs
awarded by a court.56 Rights of compensation under the Convention re-
52 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter, done Dec. 29, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 2403, T.I.A.S. No. 8165.
53 This Convention is discussed in C. PEARSON, INTERNATIONAL MARINE ENWRONMNT
POLICY: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION 65, 66 (1975).
I" Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, done May 25, 1962, re-
printed in 57 An. J. INT'L L. 268 (1963). This Convention was signed by 14 States. The
United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, France, and Germany were
not among the signatories.
5 An "operator" is the person authorized to operate a nuclear ship, or, if a contracting
State operates a nuclear ship, that State. Id. art. I 4, at 268. "Nuclear damage" is defined
as loss of life or personal injury and loss or damage to property resulting from the radioac-
tive properties or the combination of radioactive and other hazardous properties of nuclear
fuel or of radioactive products or waste. Id. 7, at 268.
56 Id. art. III 11, at 270. A "franc" is defined in art. III 1 4 as a unit of account consti-
tuted by 65 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness 900. If a nuclear incident involves an
unlicensed nuclear ship flying the flag of a signatory State, the shipowner will have absolute,
unlimited liability for damages. Id. art. XV 1 2, at 275.
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main actionable for ten years after the nuclear incident, or, if national law
so establishes, for three years after the date upon which the claimant
knew or should have known of the damage and its cause.57 A claimant
may bring suit either before the courts of the State in which the operator
is licensed or before the courts of the State in whose territory nuclear
damage was suffered.58 Sovereign immunity is waived for such actions
brought under the Convention. 9 Signatory States explicitly agree to en-
force final judgments rendered in such cases brought in other signatory
States.60 Further, the States agree not to discriminate in such actions on
the basis of nationality, domicile, or residence."s
The Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, in
short, creates a privately enforceable right to compensation for damage
suffered from incidents involving nuclear ships.2 However, a suit
brought under the Convention might have to be litigated in a State other
than the claimant's own State, since actions are allowed only in the State
which licensed the nuclear ship or in the State in whose territory the
damage was suffered. Such a suit would necessarily entail greater expense
and delay than would a domestic suit, and might possibly be tainted by
judicial bias, as previously discussed. Also, since many countries which
license nuclear ships have not signed the Convention, 3 citizens of several
nations derive absolutely no rights under the Convention.
The Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nu-
clear Energy64 creates individually enforceable rights for persons injured
by nuclear incidents originating at land-based nuclear power plants.
These rights of action are virtually identical to those created for individu-
als under the Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships,
discussed above.65 The Convention Supplementary to the Paris Conven-
tion66 extends these rights of action to cases involving damage suffered on
7 Id. art. V 51 1, 3, at 270-71.
58 Id. art. X, at 272.
69 Id.
Id. art. XI 4, at 273.
9' Id. art. XII 1 3, at 274.
62 The Convention never defines the word "claimant." I have assumed that "claimant"
has the same definition as "person." "Person" is defined as any individual or partnership,
or any public or private body whether corporate or not, including a State or any of its
constituent subdivisions. Id. art. 11 3, at 268.
"' See Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, supra note 54.
', Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris
Convention), adopted July 29, 1960, reprinted in J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, THE INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW OF POLLUTION 422 (1974). This Convention has been signed by 16 States, most
of which are European.
" The pertinent provisions of the Paris Convention are arts. 1, 3, 7(b) & (g), 8(a), 11,
13(a), (e), & (f). Id. at 422-31.
"' Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29th July, 1960, on Third
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or over the high seas, for which an operator of a nuclear installation is
liable under the Paris Convention.
6 7
The rights created under the Paris Convention and its Supplement
carry, of course, the same drawbacks discussed in connection with the
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships. Furthermore,
the rights created under the Paris Convention accrue almost exclusively
to citizens of European countries, since only a few countries outside of
Europe have signed the Convention.
The Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage6 8 is
almost identical to the Paris Convention and, therefore, will not be ex-
amined further.
The Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Den-
mark, Finland, Norway and Sweden6 9 is a liability agreement in sub-
stance, if not in name. This Convention guarantees equal access and non-
discrimination to citizens of any signatory State bringing an action in
another signatory State to prevent or seek compensation for environmen-
tal damage.7 0 The Convention closely parallels the format recommended
by the OECD.7 1 Such rights of action necessarily imply underlying liabil-
ity on the part of polluters, including persons causing transnational radia-
tion pollution. This Convention guarantees to a private party the right to
bring suit or participate in other formal proceedings in a foreign State
when pollution (including radiation pollution) has emanated from opera-
tions in that State, or when pollution is threatened. However, as previ-
ously discussed, litigation or participation in other formal proceedings in
a foreign State would almost inevitably involve more time and expense
than would domestic proceedings.7
2
The multi-party liability agreements, in general, allow a citizen of
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, done Jan. 31, 1963, reprinted in J. BARRos &
D. JOHNSTON, supra note 64, at 439.
"I Id. art. 2(a)(ii). Operators of nuclear installations are liable for damage caused by
nuclear incidents involving nuclear substances in carriage from the nuclear installations or
in storage. Paris Convention, supra note 64, at art. 4, at 424.
6 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, opened for signature May
29, 1963, reprinted in J. BARRos & D. JOHNSTON, supra note 64, at 445; 2 INT'L LEGAL
MATERIALS 727 (1963); IAEA Document CN-12/46 (May 20, 1963). As of May 22, 1963, this
Convention had been signed by China, Colombia, Lebanon, the Philippines, and Yugoslavia.
69 Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark, Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden (Nordic Environmental Protection Convention), done Feb. 19, 1974, re-
printed in UNITED NATIONS, NATIONAL LEGISLATION AND TREATIES RELATING TO THE LAW OF
THE SEA 397, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/18 (1976).
7o Id. art. 3, at 397-98.
1 The relevant provisions of the Convention are id. arts. 3, 4, 11, 12, at 397-99. See
section IIA2 in this article for a discussion of the OECD recommendations.
71 Domestic litigation, as previously discussed, is almost always a time-consuming and
expensive undertaking.
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any signatory State to bring suit in any other signatory State. Except for
the Convention on the Protection of the Environment Between Denmark,
Finland, Norway and Sweden, these agreements address only the right to
recover damages after injury, and not the right to enjoin harmful or po-
tentially harmful activities. The suits which are allowed will almost al-
ways be expensive and time consuming. Furthermore, several nations par-
ticipating in the activities contemplated by these agreements have not
signed the conventions. Thus, citizens of several nations derive no bene-
fits whatsoever from the agreements.
3. Summary
The international agreements which incorporate the law of neigh-
borly relations confer little practical benefit upon private parties wishing
to protect themselves against transnational radiation pollution. The anti-
pollution conventions create a duty not to cause or allow radiation pollu-
tion, but they do not create a private right to enforce that duty or to
collect damages for its breach. The liability agreements, in contrast, allow
private parties access to formal proceedings in foreign signatory States in
order to protect their rights against transnational radiation pollution.
Under all but one of the liability agreements, however, it is doubtful
whether a private party may enjoin a harmful activity before it occurs.
Furthermore, several States involved in nuclear activities have not signed
the liability agreements, thus denying to all of the citizens of those States
the protections which are afforded by the agreements.
III. PRIVATE PARTY PROTECTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL RADIATION
POLLUTION THROUGH COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: A PROPOSAL AND
JUSTIFICATION
A. The Proposal
In order to effectively protect himself from transnational radiation
pollution, a person must have the legal right to enjoin potentially harmful
activities and to collect damages for harm already suffered. That legal
right should be enforceable through straightforward, efficient, and inex-
pensive proceedings. Further, such proceedings should be conducted by a
neutral body comprised of experts in the fields of nuclear technology, ra-
diation pollution, and international law.
As discussed above, general international law provides avenues by
which a private party may protect himself from transnational radiation
damage. Unfortunately, these. avenues are often difficult to traverse; they
are time consuming and expensive, and often result in a dead-end; e.g.,
when one's government refuses to press a case against another govern-
ment for diplomatic reasons. At best, the established route results in a
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case which cannot be controlled by the private party complainant.
The international agreements which incorporate the law of neigh-
borly relations provide little more protection to the private citizen than
do general principles of international law. Many agreements do not create
privately enforceable rights. Those agreements which do recognize private
rights of action lack several important signatory States. Moreover, citi-
zens of nations which have signed these latter agreements are generally
given only the right to bring lawsuits in foreign countries. As previously
discussed, such lawsuits are inefficient, expensive, and awkward for per-
sons unfamiliar with the foreign legal systems involved.
The best method of private party protection against transnational ra-
diation pollution would be international arbitration, conducted under the
auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to
implement this program the IAEA Statute" should be amended to: (1)
empower the IAEA to act as an arbitral body in cases of actual or poten-
tial transnational radiation pollution involving citizens of States who are
signatories to the IAEA Statute; (2) authorize the IAEA to compel arbi-
tration among involved parties when at least one party requests arbitra-
tion; and (3) guarantee that signatory States will enforce the judgments
rendered in such IAEA arbitration cases, whether the judgments are mon-
etary or injunctive.74
1 Statute of the IAEA, opened for signature Oct. 26, 1956, 8 U.S.T. 1093, T.I.A.S. No.
3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; Amendment to the Statute of the IAEA, approved Oct. 4, 1961, 14
U.S.T. 135, T.I.A.S. No. 5284; Amendment to the Statute of the IAEA, approved Sept. 28,
1970, 24 U.S.T. 1637, T.I.A.S. No. 7668. At present, the IAEA operates under its own initia-
tive only as an information-gathering and advisory body. (The IAEA may submit advisory
briefs under its own initiative to the ICJ. See the Statute of the International Court of
Justice, supra note 30, art. 34 2.) The IAEA may, upon the request of member countries,
apply safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials to weapons manufacture or may
apply safety standards to nuclear activities. See the Statute of the IAEA, supra, arts. III,
VIII, XI, XII. The IAEA's safeguarding function has been extensively requested; its applica-
tion of safety standards has not. See Note, A Survey of the United States Treaties and
Agreements Involving the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, supra note 9, at 691. As of
1977, 109 countries had become parties to the IAEA Statute. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUe.
No. 8891, TREATIES IN FORCE 262-63 (1977).
14 One might argue that this third provision is unnecessary since most cases coming
before the IAEA would involve commercial nuclear facilities or commercial nuclear ships
and would presumably fall under the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3, codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08
(1970) [hereinafter 1958 convention]. However, the 1958 Convention might be interpreted as
applying only to differences arising out of legal relationships which are considered commer-
cial. Id. art. 1. Even if the 1958 Convention might have broader applications than this con-
struction contemplates, it should be noted that more than one-third of the 1958 Conven-
tion's signatories have explicitly limited the application of the 1958 Convention to just such
a construction. See the declarations and reservations made by the 1958 Convention's signa-
tories, reprinted in UNITED NATIONS, UNITED NATIONS MULTILATERAL TREATIES 522 (1977).
The cases of the type discussed in this article would not normally arise out of commercial
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The proposed arbitration program should encompass the following
elements. (1) Each signatory State would establish an agency or organiza-
tion to educate the public about the IAEA program and to investigate
parties' complaints. A case could be brought before the IAEA for arbitra-
tion only with the approval of the State organization, which would pro-
vide assistance in the initial phases of such a case. The State organization
would also be obligated under the IAEA Statute amendments to bring
suit against a citizen who refused to cooperate in arbitral proceedings af-
ter being called upon to do so by the IAEA. (2) The parties to the dispute
would agree on a language to be used in the arbitration. If no such agree-
ment could be reached within a reasonable period of time, the IAEA
would determine the language to be used. (3) Each party to the dispute
would choose one arbitrator from a list to be provided by the IAEA. The
selected arbitrators would together choose one additional arbitrator from
the same list. (4) The actual place of arbitration would be decided upon
by the arbitrators, with the aim of making the location as convenient as
possible for all parties concerned. (5) The governing law in the proceed-
ings would consist of the law of neighborly relations and other basic prin-
ciples of international law. 5 (6) Rules of procedure established by the
IAEA would be uniform, but would incorporate as much flexibility as pos-
sible. The imposition of uniform rules upon the cases before the IAEA
would save time and expense. Such rules would not be as rigid as the
procedural rules followed in court proceedings. The parties involved in
these arbitral proceedings would be given ample opportunity to orally
present their views and interests, through an interpreter if necessary. If a
majority of the arbitrators felt it necessary, experts in other fields, such
as economics, marine biology, statistics and urban management would be
called upon to testify during the proceedings. Costs would be defrayed by
an IAEA-managed fund to which all signatory States would contribute.7 6
relationships; rather, they would arise out of legal relationships (by virtue of the law of
neighborly relations) involving commercial enterprises but not usually involving commercial
activities between the involved parties.
75 The arbitrators would have to avoid choosing arbitral locations where local laws re-
quire that the law of the place of arbitration governs the substance of the dispute or the
rules of the arbitral proceedings. See Holtzmann, The Importance of Choosing the Right
Place to Arbitrate an International Case, in SYMPOSIUM - PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1976 183, 193-94, 204, 206 (V. Cam-
eron ed. 1977).
11 One expert in the field of transnational pollution has suggested that an international
commission of experts ought to levy emission taxes on residuals released into the environ-
ment. This would result in reasonable sharing of environmental management costs on a
worldwide basis, and would create a fund for use in programs such as the one proposed in
this article. See Cumberland, Establishment of International Environmental Standards -
Some Economic and Related Aspects, in PROBLEMS IN TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 214
(1974). The areas of concern in detailing this arbitration proposal were tailored to satisfy
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B. The Justification
Private party arbitration under the IAEA, as proposed above, would
provide a uniform, straightforward method of private party protection
against transnational radiation pollution throughout the world. Such a
system, implemented by treaty,7 would codify a private person's right to
protect himself against transnational radiation pollution. Since the sys-
tem would be administered by an international body, no party could gain
an unfair advantage over another due to greater familiarity with the sys-
tem or to court bias. An IAEA arbitration also would be less expensive
than a lawsuit. Further, such arbitration would remain in the control of
the private parties involved, since the parties would choose their arbitra-
tors and would be allowed to present their own cases at the arbitral hear-
ings. Finally, since the arbitration would be conducted by experts in the
field, hearings would proceed quickly and judgments would be based
upon well-informed and reasonable analyses of the problems involved.
Such efficiency would greatly increase an individual's opportunity to pre-
vent the serious, virtually irreparable damage that can result from radia-
tion pollution, before that damage occurs.
In general, arbitration is almost always faster than court proceed-
ings.78 It has the advantage of being understood by members of divergent
legal systems. 9 Arbitration is considered especially useful in technical ar-
eas, such as nuclear technology, where knowledgeable arbitrators would
reduce the need for the costly, time-consuming use of expert witnesses.80
Arbitration protects the interests of the parties involved, and provides
flexibility while adhering to internationally accepted legal procedures and
to fundamental legal principles.81 Decisions rendered by arbitrators can
cover a wide spectrum, from a holding entirely in favor of one side to a
the checklist of contents of arbitration clauses set forth in Asken, A Practical Guide to
International Arbitration, in SymposIuM - PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SO-
LUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss IN 1975 51, 56 (V. Cameron ed. 1976).
7 The IAEA Statute, supra note 73, is a form of treaty. See LORD McNAmR, THE LAW
OP TREATIES 22-24 (1961).
7 See supra note 41; Eubanks, supra note 36, at 129; L. HYDEMAN & W. BERMAN, supra
note 9, at 344; Smets, The OECD Approach to the Solution of Transfrontier Pollution
Problems, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - INTERNATIONAL AND COMP'ARATIVE ASPECTS 3, 9 (J. No-
wak ed. 1976).
7' Eubanks, supra note 36, at 129.
80 Lebedev, Developing Effective International Commercial Arbitration, 30 ARB. J. 59,
70 (1975). In some fields, such as commercial disputes, arbitrators are now typically chosen
from a list of experts. Expert witnesses still might be necessary in such arbitration proceed-
ings, but not so many as would be required in litigation. Furthermore, the testimony of the
expert witnesses would probably be more quickly understood by knowledgeable arbitrators
than by judges with no technical training in the fields involved.
" Eubanks, supra note 36, at 144.
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50/50 compromise,s 2 so they are likely to be well tailored to the needs ofthe case under consideration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Individuals who have suffered or who may suffer transnational radia-
tion damage to themselves, their property, or their businesses do not
have, as a practical matter, adequately enforceable rights of protection
against such damage under general international law or under presently
existing treaties. The most progressive and useful system being imple-
mented today to afford such private party protection is a program of
equal access to formal proceedings in a foreign State, such as that con-
templated by the OECD recommendations. However, "regional organiza-
tions [such as national courts] are not appropriate bodies to undertake
the primary responsibility for resolving the multinational problems in-
volved [with transnational radiation pollution].""3 The IAEA should be
given the power to resolve these problems.
Private parties ought to be able to protect themselves against trans-
national radiation pollution by instituting arbitral proceedings under a
system administered by the IAEA. Such a system would codify private
party rights against transnational radiation pollution, and would provide
a straightforward, neutral, inexpensive, and efficient method of enforcing
those rights. Authors on the subject have argued that nongovernmental
organizations, such as the IAEA, should be given greater authority than
they have held in the past. This, say two authors, "is proper in order to
allow private parties the right to protect themselves or secure compensa-
tion for injuries to their environmental interests.""
The injuries which can be suffered from radiation pollution are im-
mense. In addition, worldwide growth of the nuclear industry is increas-
ing the chances of such injuries. The technology involved in the nuclear
industry, and involved therefore in radiation pollution cases, is extremely
complex. In combination, these factors make the solution of transnational
radiation pollution problems both exceedingly difficult and desperately
necessary. The solution of these problems should be rendered by an or-
ganization which is knowledgeable in both nuclear technology and inter-
national law. These solutions should be reached by use of the most
straightforward, efficient, and inexpensive means available. The solutions
should be reached through private party arbitration under the guidance
of the IAEA.
82 Id.
L. HYDEMAN & W. BERMAN, supra note 9, at 309.
Rambach & Stein, Non-Governmental Organizations: A Force for Change in the
Law of the Sea, in CRITICAL ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES ON THE LAW OF THE SEA 53, 55-56 (R.
Stein ed. 1975).
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